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Viewing cable 09THEHAGUE444, NETHERLANDS: DUTCH CONCERNS ABOUT ROTOR BLADE

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Understanding cables

Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables ([browse by origin](#) to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this [WikiSource](#) article as reference.

Discussing cables

If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at the paragraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags **#cablegate** and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. **#09THEHAGUE444**.

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
09THEHAGUE444	2009-07-22 15:01	2011-08-30 01:44	SECRET//NOFORN	Embassy The Hague

Appears in these articles:

<http://www.aftenposten.no/spesial/wikileaksdokumenter/article3988321.ece>

VZCZCXRO3536
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK RUEHSL RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTC #0444 2031501
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3079
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNNSG/NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS GROUP PRIORITY
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 1806
RUEHSW/AMEMBASSY BERN PRIORITY 4144
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1887
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 1492
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 2479
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
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S E C R E T THE HAGUE 000444

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/22/2019
TAGS: [ETTC](#) [PARM](#) [PREL](#) [ENRG](#) [NL](#) [IR](#)
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS: DUTCH CONCERNS ABOUT ROTOR BLADE
EXPORTS TO IRAN

¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: The Dutch export control authority has denied an export license for power plant turbine blades destined for Iran. Dutch officials have formally asked other European countries with companies that produce similar parts to block their export to Iran. The Dutch have asked us informally to ensure U.S. firms, such as General Electric (GE), refrain from supplying these turbine blades to Iran. END SUMMARY.

2.(S/NF) Dutch export control officials at the Ministries of Economic Affairs (MEA) and Foreign Affairs (MFA) asked to meet with EconOff June 30. MEA,s Kees Jan Steenhoek described his office,s decision to block Sulzer Eldim BV,s (Dutch subsidiary of Swiss parent company Sulzer Metco) application to export gas-fired electricity turbine replacement rotor blades to Iran. PolMilOff,s subsequent July 9 meeting with MFA,s export control policy official Josephine Frantzen provided further detail.

¶3. (S/NF) Until 2009, Dutch customs authorities routinely stopped Sulzer Eldim,s Iran-bound shipments, then released them when satisfied the rotor blades were destined for civilian-use electricity production. However, after discovering in January 2009 the UK had blocked a GBP 45 million shipment of similar parts, MEA used a &catch-all provision requiring Sulzer Eldim to obtain an export license for the blades, on the grounds the electricity could be diverted to military or nuclear programs. Sulzer Eldim subsequently applied for an export license on a EUR 40 million order. The Dutch recently denied the application and posted this information on the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) Secure Information System as NI-NL-09001.

¶4. (S/NF) The consignee in Iran is a conglomerate that supplies the civilian power sector there, but also has ties to the military. The Dutch review of the case led them to believe the electricity produced by the turbines &might not be used for civilian purposes.⁸ One of Sulzer Eldim,s directors is an Iranian national. MEA estimates blocking the firm,s exports to Iran could cause it to lose half its revenue. Sulzer Eldim has already laid off some of its 400-person staff, a controversial decision in the economically struggling southern province of Limburg where the company is located.

¶5. (S/NF) The Dutch government has demarched other European capitals -- including Paris, Berlin, and Rome -- where rotor blade manufacturers are located. According to Frantzen, the Italian government had a &positive reaction,⁸ but the others have not responded. The Dutch do not intend to demarche Washington at this time. However, GE is capable of supplying the blades, and the Dutch hope the USG will not allow GE to export these products to Iran. The Dutch want other countries to be equally vigilant in denying export licenses for these parts so as to maintain cohesion within the NSG and not disadvantage Dutch business interests. The Dutch are particularly concerned German company Siemens will continue to export the blades to Iran.

GALLAGHER